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 Twenty years ago, the People’s Republic of China was East Asia’s largest oil exporter. 
Today, it is the world’s second largest importer.1 Beginning in 1993, China became a net 
importer of oil, a status that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, with analysts 
positing that “oil will be the only primary fuel capable of fulfilling China’s growing needs in 
both transportation and industry.”2 As China’s economy surges forward, growing by double-
digits the past several years, the nation’s dependence on oil and, consequently, its demand for 
the energy resource has grown exponentially. With the country transitioning away from the 
use of coal, daily oil consumption doubled over the course of the last ten years.3 In the future, 
experts expect demand for the good to continue growing, predicting an increase of 130 
percent by 2025.4 Such an increase comes on top of an already substantial demand for the 
good, one that is equal to 40 percent of the world’s total.5 
 China needs oil in order to continue its phenomenal economic development. For the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the procurement of energy resources is particularly 
important given that “growth is the cornerstone of China’s social stability.”6 Limitations on 
energy could slow economic expansion, inspiring social unrest and posing a severe challenge 
to the CCP’s leadership of the country. Thus, for the Party, the ability to continue obtaining a 
sufficient amount of oil to fuel development is a matter of serious importance. Such a dire 
need for oil has led the CCP to pursue a policy in which China imports the good from every 
available source.7 Among these sources is the continent of Africa, an area of the world rich in 
oil and mineral deposits but frequently ignored by many of the more developed countries. 
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 In many ways, China’s turn to Africa has been one inspired by necessity. “As a late 
entrant into the global oil industry, Africa represents the last major source of oil reserves that 
are not managed by Western energy companies.”8 Although the Middle East still provides 
China with a substantial portion of its oil, Western firms dominate the region, heightening 
competition and significantly increasing the price of the good.9 As a result, China has diverted 
much of its attention to obtaining oil from the world’s poorest continent, a move that has 
proven successful in light of the fact that “[t]he Gulf of Guinea, along the Western African 
coast, is among the fastest-growing areas of oil and gas development in the world.”10  
 Driven by its need for energy, China’s increased economic engagements with Africa 
has led to a significant evolution in bilateral political, foreign aid, and cultural exchanges. 
This paper seeks to examine the dynamics of the rapidly developing Sino-African 
relationship, reviewing the history of their interactions before analyzing each of the 
aforementioned facets of the connection and considering international criticism of Chinese 
involvement with the continent. Ultimately, it will fully explicate the benefits of the 
relationship for the Chinese as well as consider the implications of China’s increased 
engagements with Africa on the continent’s indigenous populace. 
 
The History of Sino-African Relations 
While the Sino-African relationship has grown increasingly dynamic in recent years, 
contact between the two is not a new phenomenon. During the fifteenth century, the Ming 
Dynasty sponsored exploratory voyages “intended as demonstrations of the greatness of 
Chinese civilization.”11 A few of these navigators were reported to have touched down on 
Africa’s eastern coast, the first known contact between the two civilizations.12 Far from 
beginning an age of steady trade and interaction, however, the landing of these explorers was 
an anomaly in a period of relative disconnect between China and Africa. Rather, the 
normalization of relations between the two would not occur until the founding of the PRC and 
the advent of the Cold War. 
 In his book, China’s African Policy, as well as within the pages of several journal 
articles, scholar George T. Yu elucidated China’s Cold War approach to Africa.13 From 1949 
through the late 1980s, China, Yu notes, saw Africa as “a stage in the world’s unfolding 
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revolutionary struggle against imperialism.”14 At first, in the mid 1950s to early 1960s, the 
continent was considered an arena for Sino-American competition. Later, following the Sino-
Soviet split, it would become a battleground for the Communist world’s two goliaths.15 
Throughout this period of time, China’s primary goal in the region was to increase Third 
World solidarity by exporting its model of national revolution and economic development to 
the African nations. Once much of Africa conformed to the Chinese mold, the PRC believed 
that a “third camp” in the Cold War would naturally arise, featuring developing nations who 
had struggled to assert their sovereignty and successfully modernize under the auspices of the 
liberal Western and “revisionist” Soviet models.16 Chinese leaders pursued this goal by 
offering advisors as well as $2 billion in foreign assistance to African liberation movements 
between 1954 and 1974.17 The 1970s Sino-American rapprochement, however, coupled with 
China’s drive to utilize developed countries in the modernization of its own economy quickly 
led to the marginalization of Africa in Chinese foreign policy.18 By the end of the Cold War, 
Sino-African relations were of little significance, leading some scholars to assert that “[i]t is 
hard to make a case that Africa matters very much to China.”19  
 The recent revival of relations between China and Africa has come as the result of 
China’s profound economic development and consequent need for energy resources.20 Unlike 
past interactions between the two, which were driven by ideology, the modern Sino-African 
relationship is inspired by economic considerations. Beginning with the establishment of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the turn of the millennium, Chinese trade 
and investment in Africa skyrocketed, increasing economic interdependence and paving the 
way for further Sino-African political, foreign aid, and cultural exchanges.  
 
The Sino-African Economic Relationship 
 Economic exchanges in the form of trade and investment have provided the impetus 
for the cultivation of strong ties between China and Africa. Although such economic 
exchanges constitute only two percent of China’s aggregate trade, it has grown exponentially 
in recent years.21 In 1999, prior to the establishment of the FOCAC, bilateral trade between 
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the two regions totaled $2 billion.22 Today, seven years after the creation of FOCAC, 
economic exchanges between the two total more than $40 billion a year.23 Such a tremendous 
increase places Chinese trade with Africa as second only to the Middle East in terms of its 
growth rate.24 In the future, bilateral economic exchanges are expected to continue expanding, 
with senior economists at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce predicting that Sino-African 
trade will top $100 billion in value by the end of the decade.25  
 The fact that China and Africa “have complementary economic and commercial 
needs” serves as the primary reason for such rapid growth in bilateral trade.26 Africa is capital 
short, has a weak manufacturing base, is highly import dependent, desperately needs basic 
infrastructure, and exports a lot of petroleum. China, meanwhile, has ample investment 
capital, a huge manufacturing export base, is willing to build infrastructure, and needs to 
import petroleum.27 The African countries provide attractive markets for Chinese producers 
who have an abundance of manufactures, especially low-cost consumer goods, machinery and 
armaments.28 Such an attraction has led 700 Chinese state owned enterprises to begin 
operating on the continent. Opportunities to invest in Africa have also enticed Chinese 
producers, leading them to commit over $1.2 billion to African capital and infrastructure.29 
Such investment has, in part, been inspired by China’s Commerce Ministry and National 
Development and Reform Commission, which published a list of African countries and 
resources in which investment is eligible for state subsidies.30 
 While Sino-African trade is bilateral in its nature, with goods flowing both to and from 
the two partners, African exports to China are far more homogeneous than the diverse array of 
goods imported by the continent. Over 90 percent of Africa’s exports to China are natural 
resources, the preponderance being energy resources.31 This has led to a situation in which 
Beijing’s closest connections in Africa are with oil-producing states, the top five being 
Angola, South Africa, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial 
Guinea.32 Such a pattern of trade, copious amounts of low-cost manufactures and investment 
in exchange for oil and other natural resources, has served China well, providing the economy 
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with both the energy it needs to continue growing and a more diverse marketplace in which 
Chinese manufactured goods can be sold. As a result, both the volume of economic exchanges 
and the level of economic interdependence between China and Africa has increased, with 30 
percent of China’s external oil dependence imported from Africa and numerous African 
nations now turning to China for many of their basic needs.33 Such a dynamic economic 
relationship has led to the evolution of many other components of the Sino-African 
connection, among them an increase in political interactions. These interactions, coming in 
the form of state visits, forums, and continuous dialogue, have driven China and Africa ever 
closer, increasing their mutual dependence, paving the way for a smooth future of growth in 
trade, and adding political capital to China’s arsenal of tools for use in international 
diplomacy. 
 
The Sino-African Diplomatic Relationship 
 Booming trade between China and Africa as well as the establishment of organizations 
such as FOCAC has opened the doors for increased bilateral political interactions. Beyond 
simply paving the way for continued economic transactions between the two, higher 
frequencies of diplomatic exchange has increased solidarity between China and Africa, 
offering China a significant amount of political capital as it attempts to expand its influence in 
the international political arena.  
 Thus far, FOCAC has convened three times. The inaugural meeting was held in the 
year 2000 in Beijing, with the 2003 session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the most 
recent forum held in November 2006 in the Chinese capital.34 In addition to bringing together 
the leaders of China and the African nations, these meetings provided an opportunity for high-
level officials to plan future summits and exchanges. At the 2006 forum, political leaders 
from 48 of the 53 African countries were in attendance, including 40 heads of state.35 
Through discussions and deliberations they produced two major communiqués – “The Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)” and “The Declaration of the 
Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.” Mixed in with the foreign aid 
and cultural exchange promises of the communiqués, the two sides made several political 
commitments. Among them lies a vow to “increase high-level visits, conduct strategic 
dialogues, enhance mutual political trust and promote enduring friendship.”36 China seems to 
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have taken the lead in fulfilling this promise, having “established the diplomatic precedent of 
beginning each new year with a major official visit to Africa.”37 In 2004, President Hu Jintao 
and several other top Chinese diplomats visited the continent, with similar visits made by 
former Vice Premier Huang Ju in 2005, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao in 2006, and Hu as well 
as Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in 2007.38 These visits have given the two sides the 
opportunity to address a number of issues, ranging from trade to development assistance. In 
addition, they have strengthened the Sino-African connection, furthering China’s efforts to 
create a multipolar world that offsets American primacy.39 
 Referring to itself as “the largest developing country in the world,” China markets 
itself to the African nations as an alternative, non-Western model of governance and 
development.40 Thus far, Beijing seems to have been successful in this presentation of itself 
as “[i]n general, African states view China as one of their own – a Third World country.”41 
Such solidarity has provided significant support to China in multilateral organizations such as 
the United Nations, helping block resolutions condemning Chinese human rights abuses.42 In 
addition, it has aided China in obtaining the rights to host major world events such as the 
2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo.43 With political ties between the two sides only 
growing stronger, the substantial African voting block is expected to continue backing China 
in many of its political and economic endeavors.44 
 Kick-started by a surge in bilateral trade, political engagements between China and 
Africa have increased in both frequency and importance. Such a flourishing diplomatic 
relationship all but guarantees continued growth in trade and provides China with a continent 
full of strategic partners to be utilized in multilateral diplomacy. As China continues to ascend 
toward international political superpowerdom, these partnerships will prove integral in any 
disputes that may arise with the West. One implication of the increased frequency in Sino-
African political interactions has been a rapid rise in the amount of Chinese development 
assistance granted to Africa. This assistance reaffirms the bonds of the Sino-African 
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relationship, enhancing China’s ability to employ soft power resources in its international 
political endeavors. 
 
Chinese Foreign Aid to Africa 
 The advent of more frequent meetings between Chinese and African leaders has led to 
large increases in Chinese assistance to Africa’s poorer nations. While Beijing attributes such 
increases in aid to China’s effort to implement the concept of a “harmonious world,” it does 
not hurt that development assistance to Africa both greases the wheels of trade and earns 
China “significant political capital among African countries, ensuring their support in the 
U.N. and other multilateral forums.”45 
 Both FOCAC and the many high-level exchanges between China and Africa have led 
to several different forms of development assistance. At the 2003 FOCAC, China announced 
debt forgiveness to 31 of Africa’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and least 
developed countries (LDCs) totaling roughly $1.3 billion.46 Not to be outdone by their own 
past actions, China, in the Beijing Action Plan that came out of the November 2006 FOCAC, 
promised to double development assistance to Africa by 2009 as well as cancel numerous 
government free interest loans granted to HIPCs and LDCs. In addition to financial assistance, 
the latest Beijing Action Plan also proclaimed China’s intent to build valuable infrastructure 
in Africa, including 10 hospitals and 30 anti-malarial clinics.47 All of this comes on top of the 
multitude of schools, hospitals, dams, government offices and stadiums already being 
constructed by China throughout the continent.48 African excursions by Chinese leaders and 
diplomats have also yielded new packages of assistance. Visiting eight countries in 10 days in 
January and February 2007, President Hu Jintao “left behind a multibillion dollar trail of 
forgiven debts [and] cheap new loans.”49 Whether the aid emanated from forums or state-to-
state summitry, it has been increasing in recent years, helping African nations in dire need of 
assistance and providing China with the support of its leaders as Beijing pursues new trade 
opportunities and political ties with the continent. 
 It is important to note that while China’s development assistance is aiding many 
African nations, it also benefits the Chinese. As is the case with every component of China’s 
engagement with Africa, economic considerations underwrite the granting of foreign aid. 
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Thus, the Chinese have become “adept at combining ‘foreign aid’ packages with commercial 
and oil deals.”50 Other considerations at work in China’s decision to provide Africa with 
development assistance are political in nature. By supporting the continent financially, China 
gains valuable political capital for use on the floor of the United Nations or in other 
international institutions where China may need help in implementing its policies. Ultimately, 
aid is aid and Africa is receiving over half of all development assistance granted by China.51 
Such support, however, is not entirely devoid of economic and political benefit to the 
Chinese. 
 
Sino-African Cultural Exchanges 
 As is the case with foreign aid, a combination of economic and political considerations 
have increased the frequency of cultural exchanges between China and Africa. Most of these 
exchanges are geared at providing Africa with the resources needed for sustainable 
development as well as bolstering ties between the two sides in order to ensure future success 
and solidarity in the realms of trade and international diplomacy.  
 Through the end of 2005, China had signed 65 cultural agreements with African 
nations and implemented 151 plans of cultural exchange.52 This volume of exchange will only 
increase following the November 2007 FOCAC as the two sides have promised to “[i]ncrease 
dialogue between different cultures, promote people-to-people exchanges and interaction, 
particularly those between the young people, and boost exchanges and cooperation in such 
areas as culture, science and technology, education, sports, the environment, tourism and 
women affairs.”53 As indicated in the FOCAC vow, Sino-African cultural exchanges come in 
many forms. Education and tourism, however, are the primary facilitators of such interactions. 
 In the past few years, China has established Confucian institutes at universities in 
Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa, with plans to open five more in the near future. Here, 
young African men and women can study Chinese language and culture, an endeavor 
currently entertained by over 8,000 students. 54 For those wishing further immersion in 
Chinese culture and society, there are 2,000 scholarships available for study at a university in 
China, with the promise of an increase to 4,000 within the next three years.55 Beyond simply 
offering educational opportunities to Africa’s youth, China also provides training for many 
African adults, regularly hosting aspiring diplomats for all expenses paid stays at Beijing’s 
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Foreign Affairs University and promising to train 15,000 professionals in a diverse array of 
fields between now and 2009.56 Cultural exchanges between China and Africa also benefit 
Chinese nationals. For Chinese youths wishing to be immersed in African culture there are 
300 spots in the newly announced Chinese Young Volunteers Serving Africa Program. While 
volunteering abroad, these young men and women will have the opportunity to experience the 
ideologies and way of life of an African nation and, at the same time, share some of their own 
culture and ideals with their host.57 For adults, Africa can represent a land of opportunity. As 
Chinese companies continue to expand throughout the region, opportunities for Chinese 
citizens to work and receive training there have grown. Thus far, upwards of 80,000 people 
have taken advantage of such opportunities, immigrating to the continent.58  
Tourism has also become a major source of Sino-African cultural exchange. As the 
Chinese economy continues to grow and the nation’s citizens increasingly reap the rewards of 
its development, more people are choosing to travel, both domestically and internationally. 
With over two dozen African countries officially designated as destinations for Chinese 
tourists, 110,000 Chinese nationals visited Africa in 2005, double the number that traveled to 
the continent in 2004.59 Such tourist trips, in fact, have become so popular among the Chinese 
that it has inspired China’s Southern Airlines to offer its first regular flight between China and 
Africa.60 
 Adding another dimension to the ever-evolving Sino-African relationship, cultural 
exchanges further familiarize the two sides with one another, signifying both mutual goodwill 
and a shared desire for increased engagement in the future. However, while both China and 
Africa seem to be pleased with the development of their relationship, not all are happy about 
China’s increased engagement with the continent. Rather, some international spectators – 
nations, non-governmental organizations and scholars alike – have decried increased Chinese 
involvement in the region, claiming that it represents a new form of colonialism in Africa and 
has undermined Western efforts to promote human rights. 
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Chinese Colonialism and Human Rights Abuses – Criticism of the Sino-
African Friendship 
 As the Sino-African strategic partnership continues to strengthen, many individuals, 
nations, and international organizations have questioned the utility of China’s increased 
engagement with the continent. One concern is that China’s heightened involvement signifies 
the advent of a new age of colonialism in Africa. This concern stems primarily from the belief 
that China is implementing a mercantilist system in the region – extracting raw goods and 
resources from Africa, using them in industrial production, then selling finished products back 
to the impoverished nations at a premium.61 Fairly recent in origin, such concerns have yet to 
be legitimated and do not receive a substantial amount of attention from actors outside of 
Africa. Instead, the incidence of the focus has been on the impact that Chinese aid, devoid of 
political conditionalities, has had on Western efforts to protect human rights in some of the 
more volatile African nations. In its quest to gain access to oil, China has partnered up with 
some of Africa’s more unsavory regimes, among them the leadership in Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, inspiring questions as to whether or not Chinese increased engagement in the 
region is beneficial to Africa’s indigenous populace. 
 Holding that “[t]he Western approach of imposing its values and political system on 
other countries is not acceptable to China,” Beijing has consistently stated that human rights 
abuses and governmental malfeasance in countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial 
Guinea are domestic affairs and should not be taken into consideration when conducting 
foreign policy.62 The most conspicuous instance of China ignoring such “domestic affairs” in 
order to continue developing bilateral relations is in its interactions with Sudan, the home of 
an ongoing genocide. Currently, Sudan provides China with six percent of its oil imports, an 
amount that is likely to increase dramatically when the new fields in the Melut basin go into 
production.63 While the rest of the world shies away from Sudan for fear of being charged 
with supporting its blatant violations of human rights, China has increased its investment in 
the country, taking in 80 percent of its exported oil.64 In exchange for its oil, Sudan has 
received several significant forms of assistance.  
As Sudan’s single largest financial supporter, China has provided the embroiled nation 
with numerous forms of monetary aid, including a $13 million interest free loan to build a 
new presidential palace.65 Beyond grants and loans, China has also provided Sudan with a 
wealth of arms and munitions. Now Sudan’s single largest supplier of defense-oriented 
products, China has sold fighter jets, small arms, military trucks, helicopters, ammunition, and 
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anti-personnel mines “that have turned up in Khartoum’s campaign against the Southern 
Sudanese.”66 Arguably, however, the most important form of assistance China has provided 
Sudan is diplomatic. Wielding a veto in the U.N. Security Council, China has consistently 
headed off international calls for the installation of a peacekeeping force in Darfur, only 
recently changing its stance as external pressure mounted and Sudan’s president, Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir, approved international assistance.67 
 Sudan is not the only instance of China undermining international efforts to protect 
human rights. While Chinese “no strings attached” aid packages to Angola and Equatorial 
Guinea disrupted World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempts to inspire 
governmental reform there, the Sino-Zimbabwean friendship has led dictator Robert Mugabe 
to openly boast that his connection with China allows him to ignore Western pressure on him 
to protect human rights and ensure sound governance.68 By offering these regimes with the 
resources they need in order to continue operating effectively, China severely hampers 
international efforts to curb poor governance and prevent mass human rights abuses in Africa. 
With their incentives-based reform system undercut by Chinese aid packages, organizations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF are left without their primary tool for inspiring change. 
As a result, the African people are forced to deal with corrupt leaders and the marginalization 
of human rights. 
 There is no doubt that China’s relationship with some of Africa’s more unsavory 
regimes has inhibited the international community from protecting human dignity and 
inspiring reform within the countries these regimes lead. Further, the newly emerging charge 
that China’s foreign policy toward Africa has taken on some of the characteristics of 
mercantilism seems to correspond with the current system, one in which China procures 
energy from the continent in order to fuel its own economy, produces manufactures, then 
ships them back to Africa for sale. In light of these issues, China has come under fire in the 
realm of international politics. Does, however, China deserve such criticism? In a cost-benefit 
analysis, do the costs of China’s increased involvement in Africa outweigh the benefits 
enjoyed by the African people? These are the questions that ultimately surface in an analysis 
of the evolving Sino-African relationship. These are the questions that should be answered in 
order to pass judgment on Chinese engagement with the continent. 
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ent’s citizens. 
                                                
The Implications of China’s Increased Involvement in Africa 
With its economy burgeoning and continued growth a cornerstone of social stability, 
China has turned to Africa to fulfill its increasing energy needs. Although the Sino-African 
relationship is one that has its origins in economic considerations, it has quickly become far 
more dynamic, featuring political, foreign aid, and cultural exchange components. Recent 
plans for high-level personnel and technological exchanges between Chinese and African 
militaries have suggested that China may be adding an important new facet to the relationship 
– security.69 Today, China’s interests in the continent transcend simply a need for energy. 
Rather, Africa has become the test grounds for China’s rise to international political 
prominence. Through economic and diplomatic relations as well as provisions for foreign aid 
and cultural exchanges, the PRC has been steadily building up its soft power resources in the 
region, attempting to assert itself as a responsible global stakeholder. 
 Despite its efforts, however, China’s increased involvement in Africa has been met 
with both skepticism and criticism by the international community. Pointing to Chinese 
financial and diplomatic support of human rights violators and corrupt authoritarian regimes 
such as those in Sudan and Zimbabwe, critics correctly identify China as a significant force 
inhibiting Western governments and organizations from being able to ensure peace and 
stability in Africa. Nevertheless, Chinese engagement with the African nations certainly 
yields its benefits, especially “in the sense that it is providing sorely needed investment that 
was not being offered by others.”70 Thus, the question being asked by any and all who 
analyze the evolving Sino-African relationship is whether or not China’s increased 
involvement in Africa is, in aggregate, of benefit or detriment to the contin
 The answer is far from simple. While Chinese policies are improving lives in some 
parts of Africa, they are destroying lives in others. In light of this complex situation, scholars 
and policy-makers examining the Sino-African relationship have concluded that “the net 
benefits are not clear.”71 Perhaps, then, it is time to change the nature of the question being 
asked. Regardless of whether or not Chinese involvement in Africa is beneficial to the 
continent’s constituents, it is not likely to abate any time soon. Thus, rather than weighing the 
positive and negative aspects of the Sino-African relationship in an attempt to pass judgment 
on Chinese engagement with the region, the international community must now accept the 
realities of China’s presence there and shift its focus to the question of how, given Chinese 
involvement, optimal African peace and stability can be ensured.  
 
69 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “China’s African Policy.” op cit. 
70 Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” 951. 
71 Lewis, op cit. 42. 
